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Memory Lost: Brown v. Board and the
Constitutional Economy of Liberty
and Race
KENNETH M. CASEBEERt
Before it was over, they fired him from the little schoolhouse at
which he had taught devotedly for ten years. And they fired his wife
and two of his sisters and a niece. And they threatened him with
bodily harm. And they sued him on trumped-up charges and con-
victed him in a kangaroo court and left him with a judgment that
denied him credit from any bank. And they burned his house to the
ground while the fire department stood around watching the flames
consume the night. And they stoned the church at which he pastored.
And fired shotguns at him out of the dark. But he was not Job, and so
he fired back and called the police, who did not come and kept not
coming. Then he fled, driving north at eighty-five miles an hour over
country roads, until he was across the state line. Soon after, they
burned his church to the ground and charged him, for having shot
back that night, with felonious assault with a deadly weapon, and so
he became an official fugitive from justice....
All of this happened because he was black and brave. And
because others followed when he had decided the time had come to
lead.1
For Rev. J.A. DeLaine, law was experienced as a system and struc-
ture of life, not the law of the books.2 "Separate but equal" supported
and fostered the Jim Crow economic and political domination based on
race that permeated Clarendon County, South Carolina, site of Briggs v.
Elliot,3 one of four cases consolidated by Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka.4 But Delaine's time was not the only period in which race
shaped the constitutional understanding of liberty, driving and being
driven by a dominant political economy essential to racial subordina-
t Professor of Law, University of Miami Law School. The author thanks Shane Martin for
research assistance, and generations of Constitutional Law students at Miami for their insights.
1. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 3 (1976).
2. See id. at 12-25.
3. 98 F. Supp. 529, 531 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Occasioned by its fiftieth anniversary, many symposia have
celebrated and evaluated the Brown decision. See, e.g., Symposium, Brown at Fifty, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1301 (2004); Symposium, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote Eleven, and
Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005); Symposium, With All Deliberate Speed:
Brown II and Desegregation's Children, 24 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2006).
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tion.5 It has always been so in this country.
Our entire constitutional history has linked race and our concep-
tions of liberty. Indeed, in each period following the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, equality as enforced by equal protection was
itself articulated as an aspect of liberty rather than equality per se. In the
United States, judicial interpretations of the Constitution shifted: from
Liberty as vested property acquisition and Dred Scott v. Sandford,6 to
Liberty as contract and voluntary association and Plessy v. Ferguson,7 to
Liberty as participation in a fair political process and Brown, to Liberty
as exclusion from social responsibility and Parents Involved in Commu-
nity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.8 Liberty is thus the over-
arching frame of judicial intervention in or reinforcement of
governmental allocation of power to private actors. After outlining each
period of the political economy of liberty, I will show how the Carolene
Products footnote four9 context of the decision in Brown-the real
meaning of Clarendon County-undermines the reasoning of the plural-
ity decision in Parents Involved.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY AND RACE
As a corollary of enlightenment liberalism, James Madison wrote in
the Federalist Papers, the first object of our national government was the
protection and regulation of property acquisition; for how else could
each individual go their own way without the control of resources?' 0 But
furthermore in keeping with popular sovereignty, Justice John Marshall
in Marbury v. Madison" understood this logic to require that the defini-
tion of property must be property politically determined by elected rep-
resentatives. In this way property protected by judicially enforceable
constitutional liberty was vested only when in conformity to positive
law. The Constitution protected Marbury's commission by specifying
5. See Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1537, 1574 (2004) ("[C]ourts, and particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, tend, over time, to
reflect the views of national political majorities and national political elites. Constitutional
doctrine changes gradually in response to political mobilizations and countermobilizations.
Minority rights gain constitutional protection as minorities become sufficiently important players
in national coalitions and can appeal to the interests, values, and self-conception of majorities, but
minority rights will gain protection only to the extent that they do not interfere too greatly with the
developing interests of majorities."). Id.
6. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
9. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938).
10. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 (James Madison).
II. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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when the office vested, in contradistinction to the President's claim
under the common law that all the steps had not been completed.
In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney found this positivist logic cru-
cial in explaining that the Constitution would never have been ratified
by the southern slave-holding states if federal power were available to
interfere with the vested property definitions ordained by each state,
including property in a human being as chattel of another. Each state
defined the resources necessary to its own economic base or system, the
nation of states being largely a collection of local economies. Just as
there could be no federal power to legislate the Missouri Compromise,
there was no federal citizenship that could provide Dred Scott with
standing to use the federal courts. Scott's master must be as free to take
Scott as property defined by Georgia's slavery statute to the Missouri
territory as he would be free to take any other form of personal property.
Liberty as vested property acquisition defined by state law or the Consti-
tution itself depended upon the protection of state vested slavery. 2 We
fought a revolution and it gave us Dred Scott.
The striking down of the Missouri Compromise was one of the effi-
cient causes of the Civil War. The victory of the North changed the
relationship between constitutional Liberty and the state definition of
property acquisition. While each state still defined property per its own
interests, they could not do so without limits based in a new ideal of
liberty itself. The end of slavery and the Thirteenth Amendment meant
free labor. Each individual was free to seek the best deal he or she could
get in return for their work. Mutuality required the same protection for
capital. National mobility of labor and other resources was the concomi-
tant of free labor. Thus Liberty consisted of voluntary contract, or writ
larger, voluntary association. Liberty as free contract protected from
public interference proved an important engine of rapid industrialization
and at-will labor contracts. But this Constitutional economy also led to
Plessy v. Ferguson. Just as each side, workers and capitalists, were vir-
tually completely free to voluntarily contract over jobs, each race must
be able to voluntarily associate with each other, or not. Laws that pre-
served this "voluntarism" for those who wished no association, even if
12. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 452 (1857).
And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power
over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than
property of any other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled
with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress
which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the
territory of the United States ... is not warranted by the Constitution ....
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one race wished integration, must be upheld.' 3 We fought a Civil War
and it gave us Plessy.
Unfortunately, by the late 1920s, virtually unlimited contracting
that ignored bargaining power imbalances had led to such an imbalance
between labor and capital that wages became too low to allow demand
to clear product markets of supply. Companies began to go out of busi-
ness. Spurred by the collapse of stock speculation, this situation in turn
caused product markets to further collapse, putting more and more
workers out of work. Then even lower demand increased the downward
spiral into the Great Depression.' 4 Not only were manufactured products
a glut on the market, but so were foodstuffs and workers themselves, as
one-third of the population became unemployed, and two-thirds of those
who were working were underemployed. Products might rust, or food-
stuffs might rot in the field, until an equilibrium of supply and demand
returned, but the same result for surplus workers would not be tolerated.
Liberty as free contract no longer could be sustained.
People looked to government for solutions such as unemployment
insurance, minimum wages, and labor organization. Laws that interfered
with contracting, like those considered in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,5
and restructured markets, like those considered in N.L.R.B. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corporation," were upheld under the deferential judicial
review of minimum rationality and substantial relation to interstate com-
merce. Any substantive judicial review of legislation lacked credibility
until the famous footnote four of Carolene Products. Deference to dem-
ocratically defined public welfare, including what should be regulated
and who should be subsidized, could seemingly be overridden only if
democratic choice was unfair itself, or rigged. Thus if legislation inter-
fered with a higher ordered constitutionally legislated set of protected
values, or if the legislative process itself was a rigged political game, or
if it aimed at a political minority defined by an unchangeable trait who
by definition could not protect themselves in the political process, then
and only then judges were justified in reviewing legislation with strict
scrutiny. 7 Liberty was defined as fair participation in a fair political
13. "If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural
affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals."
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
14. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 1-14 (1966).
15. 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937).
16. 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
17. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrITTIONAL LAW 1520 (2d ed. 1988) ("[S]trict
judicial scrutiny would be reserved for those government acts that, given their history, context,
source, and effect, seem most likely not only to perpetuate subordination but also to reflect a
tradition of hostility toward an historically subjugated group, or a pattern of blindness or
[Vol. 63:537
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process kept fair by the judiciary. Individuals were free to pursue their
dreams either through the economic or the political market. This is the
form of liberty and equality that leads to the decision of Brown v. Board
of Education."8
Even though African-Americans outnumbered whites by four to
one in Clarendon County, South Carolina, a combination of exclusion-
ary devices including voter registration, voting, and segregated, inferior
schools kept African-Americans from advancing economically and
achieving mobility out of the county. Black and white schools were sep-
arate but very unequal. 9 This inequality ensured a captive labor force
for the largely tenant farming economy there. Providing a truly equal
education would endanger the entire social structure of the area as young
people could be expected to leave for better jobs, and even those who
stayed would challenge for jobs traditionally held by whites. It is in this
context that the Court in Brown wrote about the importance of educa-
tion. It wasn't that education was itself a constitutionally protected right,
but that race separation by the state perpetuated a system of inequality,
of caste.2°
indifference to the interests of that group."); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77 (1980) ("I have suggested that both Carolene Products themes
are concerned with participation: they ask us to focus.. . on whether the opportunity to participate
either in the political processes by which values are appropriately identified and accommodated,
or in the accommodation those processes have reached, has been unduly constricted.").
18. 1 am writing here of the judicial predicate to the doctrine announced in Brown. I recognize
that many social and political events such as the change in labor force composition occasioned by
the "great migration" and World War II greatly contributed to the context in which the case could
be decided at all. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIvIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 107 (2000) ("Brown was an essential and long-overdue affirmation of the
story of race and American democracy that the government had already promoted abroad.").
19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954)..
20. In Brown, the Court quotes approvingly from Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
307-08 (1880):
[I]n regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily
designed ... no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their
color[.] The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a
necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored
race,-the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctly as
colored,-exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy,
and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the conditions of a
subject race.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 490-91 n. 5 (emphasis added) (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307-08). Thus:
Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
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Understood in this way, Brown was not about the state's use of race
per se, or even racial separation per se, but rather the use of race to
perpetuate racial subordination as part of a political-economic system.2
In Clarendon County, race separation was inherently stigmatizing and a
marker of class socio-economic structure. This is why the remedy of
desegregation by dismantling the dual race system was necessary in
Brown 11,22 not just the removal of racial classification. We survived a
Great Depression and it gave us Brown.
However, Brown left open the issue of how and when the state
would be responsible for causing racial subordination. Indeed, the deci-
sion itself led to white flight from predominantly black center cities to
suburban enclaves. Whether these enclaves could be reached, at least for
remedial purposes, depended on how state causality and thus responsi-
bility would be subsequently characterized.23
The next shift in the political economy of liberty is more compli-
cated and not yet complete. Perhaps this is true because in recent
decades there has not been as deep a social upheaval generating and
being generated by legal change. However, the upholding of the consti-
tutionality of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act in the 1960s
under deferential judicial review24 comes closest to achieving the liberty
and equality presaged by Carolene Products and Brown. But just as that
liberty grows, the economy shrinks and changes-plant closings, mine
shutdowns, downsized municipal payrolls dry up actual opportunities.
At the turn into the 1970s, a combination of backlash against desegrega-
tion, the civil rights movement of the 1960s, and deep divisions about
the Vietnam War left many Americans with a desire to escape from
those unlike themselves into private enclaves. Also, as work shifted
from a manufacturing economy to lesser paying service jobs, the skew in
distribution of incomes widened, and lower paid jobs seemed more like
simply a spur to individualistic competition for the means to escape into
rampant consumption. Escape meant less concern for others and more
21. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship at Ground Level: The Consequences of Nonstate
Action, 54 DUKE L.J. 1591, 1594 (2005) ("The system of Jim Crow, given early encouragement
by the Supreme Court, was not just a legal structure. It was a total social system, in which public
and private behaviors were interlaced to maintain the subordination of a race.").
22. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
23. Michael Klarman has downplayed the instrumental effectiveness of the Brown opinion in
leading to de-segregation. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). I do not argue with that thesis
here. I am interested in the fit between judicial review and encouraging a dominant political
economy that also blocks progress toward racial equality.
24. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
[Vol. 63:537
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embrace of isolation.2"
At the same time, a new Supreme Court membership began to
rewrite constitutional interpretation by limiting state responsibility and
thus reinterpreting Brown. First, reinforcing white flight into suburban
enclaves, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley26 prevented interdistrict
desegregation even where center cities were left with an overwhelming
number of black school children, making racial balance impossible even
where there was proof of past school segregation. Second, in Pasadena
v. Spangler,27 Justice Rehnquist held that remedial racial separation
must be caused directly by the state.28 Private housing decisions, no
matter how racially motivated or perpetuating of segregation, were not
prohibited by the Constitution. It did not matter that using neighborhood
school sites reintroduced racially separate schools. The state was not
classifying by race.29
The next steps-from Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
Bakke,3" to City of Richmond's3 plurality, and to the opinion in
Adarand, 32-completed protection of enclaves by turning Brown into a
prohibition of any state use of race affecting an individual absent a com-
pelling state interest. The state could not use race to impact individuals,
but the state could reinforce community and educational racial segrega-
tion indirectly by insulating private choices from direct state orders.
Moreover, education was still the gateway to economic and social
opportunity. Housing availability and lack of transportation still isolated
many from mobility for better jobs. In a society in which people moved
often, local boundaries and traffic barriers shaped urban/suburban devel-
opment. Thus the constitutional system of liberty as exclusion from pri-
vate responsibility perpetuated and was perpetuated by the same racial
ills as in Clarendon County-community and labor force subordination
25. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 203, 257, 283-84 (2005).
26. 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
27. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
28. Despite plaintiffs claim that "white flight" resulted from the desgregation decree itself,
and the district court's finding only that results matched the state pattern as a whole, school
resegregation "apparently resulted from people randomly moving into, out of, and around the
[Pasadena School District] area. This quite normal pattern of human migration resulted in some
changes in the demographics of Pasadena's residential patterns, with resultant shifts in the racial
makeup of some of the schools." Id. at 435-36.
29. This decision was part of a broad reinterpretation of the Constitution via standing, state
action, equitable relief, section 1983, and rights themselves. See Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty
State and Nobody's Market: The Political Economy of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial
Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 247, 293-94 (2000).
30. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978).
31. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989).
32. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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by race. The country underwent social and political upheaval and it gave
us Parents Involved.
I. RACE AND THE SEATTLE PLURALITY
In announcing the decision of the Court, and writing for the plural-
ity, Chief Justice Roberts claimed to answer a very narrow question:
whether the race-based assignment of individual school attendance, in
order to create mixed race education, was sufficiently narrowly tailored
to meet a compelling interest of integrated education. His opinion
claimed to rest simply on precedent to the effect that any individual
could claim that treatment by race was inherently suspect and could not
be accomplished absent a compelling non-discriminatory interest
through means narrowly tailored to that interest. However, the opinion is
vulnerable to the extent either that the conclusion does not follow from
the precedent, or the precedents have been misinterpreted. Indeed the
opinion is rampant with invalid logical conclusions, exaggerations of
past reasoning, and self-referential choice of minority opinions. This
comment focuses on the non-contextualized reinterpretation of the key
modem case of Brown that creates three conceptual defects in the rea-
soning of Parents Involved.
First, Brown is characterized as standing for the proposition that
any use of race by the state is invidious and contrary to equality.33 This,
of course, is only correct if the Carolene Products' antisubordination
basis for Brown is ignored. Certainly any use of race formally discrimi-
nates by race, but that does not mean it is subordinating. Affirmatively
making up for past discrimination by the state should be considered
remedial rather than subordinating, though by definition it uses race.34
33. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2752, 2764
(2007). But see id. at 2836 (Breyer, J. dissenting) ("But segregation policies did not simply tell
schoolchildren 'where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin' ...
they perpetuated a caste system rooted in the institutions of slavery and [eighty] years of legalized
subordination.").
34. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms Of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. Rev. I 11, 1142 (1997). Siegel notes:
[B]y abstracting the history of racial status regulation into a narrative of "racial
classifications," the Court obscures the multiple and mutable forms of racial status
regulation that have subordinated African-Americans since the Founding-
including the facially neutral forms of state action that, since Reconstruction, have
regulated racial status in matters of employment, political participation, and criminal
justice. From this highly abstracted standpoint-one that is inattentive to the social
meaning of racial status regulation or the various and evolving forms it has assumed
over the course of American history-it "makes sense" to apply "skeptical scrutiny"
to race-conscious remedies, while reviewing facially neutral regulation
deferentially, on the premise that it is enacted in good faith.
[Vol. 63:537
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As the dissent argues, it is not clear why, understanding Brown in con-
text, such action even merits strict scrutiny.35 But Justice Roberts writes
that making up for private or social discrimination having no state
involvement has never even been held to represent a compelling interest.
He repeats that the Seattle school district was merely assigning attend-
ance following racial demographics, which to him meant the remedy
was inherently insufficiently tailored to the goal of an improved race
mixed education.36 This ignores how neighborhood schools symbioti-
cally relate to housing enclaves, each helping to shape the racial makeup
of the other, and also ignores the role of the state in shaping the
demographics of housing enclaves.
Second, a past case, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg,37 should
prove embarrassing at this point. Justice Burger explained that while
judicial remediation of past discrimination would be limited by the harm
done, legislative bodies such as school boards might decide to create
racial balance in schools for their own objectives absent invidious
goals.38 Justice Roberts simply dismisses this part of Swann as mere
dicta unnecessary to the decision on scope of judicial relief under
Brown. In this he is clearly mistaken. Justice Burger's claim about legis-
lative authority was tied to the Carolene Products justification of judi-
cial use of temporary quotas and school busing to dismantle a system
that had been found to have discriminated in the past.39 The distinguish-
ing between judicial and legislative choice depended on normal judicial
deference to elected bodies absent invidious motive or subordination
that would justify judicial equitable remedy. The legislative institution
was more free to act proactively.
A third weakness with the Parents Involved plurality opinion stems
from an assertion that Justice Roberts supposes is required: that compel-
ling governmental interests do not include making up for social discrim-
ination.40 This view is almost a return to Plessy. It protects the universe
of exclusionary acts fostered by the state but not carried out in its name.
It protects the link between segregated neighborhoods and schools
against marginal acts-all else equal-to integrate the area most directly
reachable by the state and most likely to shape future improvement for
all education. The state is still connected to much private choice, includ-
35. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2817 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. See id. at 2755-56 (Roberts, J., plurality opinion).
37. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
38. Id. at 16.
39. This is most clear by the next paragraphs' discussion of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (2000), limiting equitable relief of federal courts in de facto segregation.
Swann, 402 U.S. at 16-18.
40. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2758.
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ing housing decisions, in ways that reinforce segregation.4
Furthermore, overcoming the harms of segregation, no matter how
it is accomplished, is neither invidious nor subordinating. In fact, over-
coming spatial divisions might well lead to integration of workplaces
closer to labor force participation, something that is artificially pre-
vented by race and wealth exclusion from enclaves and by segregation
and inequality in schools. It is true that a broader conception of individ-
ual social responsibility and causality than that held by the Roberts
group would make the argument easier, but community organization,
boundaries, subsidies, and other government acts42 do not create a con-
stant vacuum in which private housing choices and school choices take
place. These actions shape resources, consumer preferences, private
investment strategies, and the subdivisions near which schools are built.
It may be that constitutional remedies cannot reach unsubsidized private
schools, but public institutions can be prevented from contributing to
economic and political subordination within the present rubric of Brown.
To see the individual in his or her historical and social context, whether
favored or disfavored, is to treat the individual as a true, living person
rather than a formal placeholder in a scheme of empty classification.43
Revolution, property and slavery; civil war, contract and segrega-
tion; depression, political participation and desegregation; division,
exclusion and enclave segregation-are not accidentally correlated.
Each represents a constitutional economy which reflects and reinforces
political-economic social structure. It should not matter that slavery to
free labor to citizen to resident/consumer as stages of identity each rep-
41. Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1659, 1669-70 (1995).
42. See Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential
Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795, 803-04 (1996) ("A host of private,
public, and governmental actors deliberately created residential segregation."); Bryan K. Fair,
Taking Educational Caste Seriously: Why Grutter Will Help Very Little, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1843,
1848 (2004) ("Only after the government eliminates the performance and attainment disparities
that it helped create will it be possible to talk about judging persons based on the content of their
character, rather than the color of their skin."); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market
Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. Rev. 727, 749 (2000) ("[G]ovemments should be
cautious about any sort of intervention into increasing returns markets.").
43. Justice Breyer in dissent in Parents Involved concluded about Brown:
It was the promise of true racial equality-not as a matter of fine words on paper,
but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation's cities and schools. It was about the
nature of a democracy that must work for all Americans. It sought one law, one
Nation, one people, not simply as a matter of legal principle but in terms of how we
actually live.
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 63:537
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resented a partial emancipation for all individuals including African-
Americans. Racial subordination still exists. Even if the state is not for-
mally directing subordination, the state is still connected to the resulting
social structure even though invisible to the Supreme Court. With regard
to the connection of liberty and race, we can remember a better direction
and a better lesson from Brown.
